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Mark D. Christiansen† 
I. NON-OPERATOR V. OPERATOR AND OTHER OIL AND GAS 
OPERATIONS-RELATED CASES 
A. The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed two certified questions 
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma regarding certain lien and trust fund 
rights under applicable statutes. 
The case of White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank, 
N.A.1 presented two questions of state law certified to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma: 
(1) Are the “trust funds” create[d] by Title 42 O.S. § 144.2, 
entitled “Creation and Appropriation of Trust Funds for 
Payment of Lienable Claims,” limited to obligations due non-




†Mark D. Christiansen is an energy and resources lawyer with the Oklahoma City 
litigation firm of Edinger Leonard & Blakley PLLC. 
 1. White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., No. 118746, 2020 
WL 6142712 (Okla. Oct. 20, 2020). 
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include payments due [to] holders of mechanic’s and 
materialmen’s liens arising under and perfected by Title 42 
O.S. § 144? 
(2) Does the Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010 grant an 
operator and non-operator working interest owner a lien in 
proceeds from purchasers of oil and gas which is prior and 
superior to any claim of the holder of a mechanic’s and 
materialmen’s lien asserted under Title 42 O.S. § 144?2 
The above questions were certified to aid in the bankruptcy court’s 
resolution of two particular adversarial proceedings. 
The first proceeding sought adjudication of the priority, validity, 
and value of approximately 2,000 mechanic’s and materialman’s liens 
(“M&M liens”) asserted by seventy-eight unpaid vendors over various 
interests held by White Star. The second proceeding sought an order 
of the bankruptcy court directing several first purchasers of oil and gas 
to turn over approximately two million dollars to White Star—the 
money held in suspense after the purchasers received statutory lien 
notices from the M&M lien claimants. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered and reformulated the first 
certified question instead ask: “Whether the funds held in trust 
pursuant to 42 Oklahoma Statutes section 144.2 for payment of 
lienable claims created by 42 Oklahoma Statutes section 144 are 
limited to joint-interest billing payments received by operators for 
services rendered by the lienholders?”3 
The Court answered the above reformulated question in the 
negative. The Court stated, “Nothing in the text or history of [section] 
144.2 limits the types of revenue [that] should be held in trust for 
payment of lienable claims.”4 The Court found no basis for White 
Star’s assertion that the applicability of section144.2(A) should be 
limited to obligations between third-party vendors and operators, 
stating that the Court would not imply limitations in the text of a 
statute that were not clearly expressed.5 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also answered the second certified 
question in the negative. White Star argued that the liens they held and 
affiliated, non-operating working interest owners under the Oil and 
Gas Owners’ Lien Act (the “Act”) were superior to those held by 
M&M lien claimants. However, based on the text and legislative 
 
 2. Id. ¶1. 
 3. Id. ¶10. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. ¶21. 
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history of the Act, the Court found that the M&M lien claimants were 
in parity to operators and non-operating working interest owners 
pursuant to that Act. Therefore, they were entitled to the same super-
priority as White Star and its affiliated non-operating working interest 
owners. 
In sum, regarding the first question of law certified by the 
bankruptcy court, the funds that must be held in trust for payment of 
lienable claims pursuant to section 144.2 are not exclusively limited 
to joint-interest billing payments received by operators for services 
rendered by the lienholders. On the second question, the Court found 
that the Act does not grant operators and non-operating working 
interest owners a lien in proceeds from the sale of oil and gas, which 
is prior and superior to any claim of the holder of a mechanic’s and 
materialmen’s lien asserted under section 144.  
B. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that if affected landowners 
are known, or reasonably discoverable, notice provided by 
publication results in an unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction 
and a denial of due process.  
In Purcell v. Parker,6 both the petitioners-Appellants and the 
respondents-appellees owned interests in real property that contained 
or abutted Colbert Lake (the “Lake”) in McClain County. They also 
owned real property that contained Colbert Creek, which was the sole 
source of water that feeds the Lake. Water from the Lake was used for 
firefighting, drinking water for livestock, and recreational use for 
residents in the area.  
On May 10, 2017, the Parkers executed a Right of Entry and 
Purchase Access Agreement with Select Energy Services (“Select”). 
The agreement allowed Select (or their appointed representatives) the 
right of entry and the right of access to their real property for the 
purpose of water transfer from the Lake for Select’s drilling and 
fracking operations. The respondents sought a permit from the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (“OWRB”) to sell water from the 
Lake to oil and gas companies for use in fracking operations.  
On May 15, 2017, the OWRB issued a provisional temporary permit 
to Select without actual notice to the petitioners. The permit allowed 
the diversion of 3,200 gallons per minute from a diversion point 
located on the Lake for the purpose of oil and gas drilling and mining. 
 
 6. Purcell v. Parker, No. 118,328, 2020 WL 5903862 (Okla. Oct. 6, 2020). 
  
2021] OKLAHOMA 419 
 
The Parkers applied for a long-term surface and stream water permit 
to withdraw water from the Lake. Although the petitioners’ family 
lived in the area for decades and were known by the Parkers, the 
Parkers provided the landowners notice by publication as required by 
82 Oklahoma Statutes 2011 section 105.11. Because the petitioners 
did not timely protest, the OWRB did not hold a hearing or individual 
proceeding regarding the Parker’s permit application. 
On June 20, 2017, the OWRB issued the stream water permit 
authorizing the Parkers to take and use 109 acre-feet of water per 
calendar year, at a rate not to exceed 3,360 gallons per minute. 
Although the petitioners did not receive actual notice of the permit 
applications, the OWRB issued the stream water permit after a 
meeting in which the petitioners apparently discovered the permits and 
were given five minutes to comment. 
On July 20, 2017, the petitioners filed a petition in the District Court 
of McClain County. The petitioners’ first claim for relief was for a 
declaratory judgment determining the stream use permit invalid based 
on insufficient actual notice to the petitioners. Second, the petitioners 
sought another declaratory judgment to nullify the temporary permit 
for lack of notice to the petitioners. The petitioners’ third and fourth 
claims for relief were for judicial review of the stream permit and an 
accounting. On October 16, 2017, the petitioners added claims for 
conversion and unjust enrichment. 
Over a year later, the trial court entered a summary order denying 
judicial review of the OWRB proceedings and the constitutional 
challenges to the petitioners’ notice pursuant to section 105.11. The 
trial court certified its summary order for interlocutory appeal. 
Thereafter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the landowners’ 
petition for certiorari to review the certified interlocutory order to 
address the issue of the level of notice constitutionally required in the 
proceeding. In particular, the action addressed whether section 105.11 
and the rules of the OWRB in conjunction were constitutionally 
sufficient. If the notice by publication permit process was not free 
from prejudicial error, the permits granted thereunder would be 
invalidated. 
Title 82 Oklahoma Statutes 2011 section 105.11 requires notice by 
publication, and the Court found that the specified procedure for 
notice by publication was indisputably followed in this case. After 
reviewing a series of prior court decisions to provide certain guidance 
in the present case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded:  
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“[I]f the affected landowners are known, or reasonably 
discoverable, notice provided by publication results in 
an unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction and a denial 
of due process. There is no excuse for failing to give 
personal notice of something that directly affects 
landowners when such landowners are known or easily 
discoverable . . . .”7 
 
The Court reversed the decision below, which granted the water 
permit without first providing proper notice and remanded the case for 
proceedings consistent with the Court’s above decision. 
II. LITIGATION OVER ROYALTIES AND OTHER PAYMENTS TO LESSORS 
The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Peters on her claim that the 
underlying oil and gas lease expired due to the lessee’s alleged failure 
to make a bonus payment provided for under the lease. The case of 
Peters v. EOG Resources, Inc.8 involved an oil and gas lease that 
Jacqueline Peters (“Peters”) executed with T.S. Dudley Land 
Company, Inc. (“TSDI”) under which TSDI was the lessee. The lease 
included an option to extend, which stated: 
 
“Lessee at its sole option may extend the primary term 
of this lease for an additional period of [t]wo years by 
causing to be delivered to Lessor on or before the 
expiration date of the primary term stated hereinabove 
an additional bonus payment equal to the bonus per net 
mineral acre paid at the execution of the original lease, 
which payment shall cover the entire [t]wo-year 
term . . . .”9 
 
The oil and gas lease did not include any express terms setting out how 
or where TSDI should deliver the bonus payment. 
TSDI assigned the subject lease to EOG Resources (“EOG”) in June 
2016; however, the record does not address when or if EOG notified 
 
 7. Id. ¶24. 
 8. Disposition of Cases Other Than by Published Opinion, Court Issue 
#118,091, 91 OKLA. B. J. 611, 647 (June 19, 2020) (discussing a summary of Peters 
v. EOG Resources, Inc.). 
 9. Appeal from Dist. Ct. McClain Cty, Okla., at 2, Peters v. EOG Resources, 
Inc., No. 118.091, (Okla. Civ. App. Jun. 1, 2020). 
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Peters that it had acquired the lease. On or before March 1, 2018, EOG 
mailed a check for the bonus payment to Peters at the address stated 
in the lease. The check was returned as undeliverable on or about 
March 15, 2018. On March 22, 2018, EOG sent a second letter to the 
same address, asking Peters to verify that the Oklahoma City address 
to which the check had been sent was a current address. 
After the term of the oil and gas lease expired, Peters’s 
granddaughter and attorney-in-fact, Shelli Bradbeary, contacted EOG 
about the extension payment. The court’s opinion discussed at length 
the gaps in information and the uncertainty as to the factual history 
from that point. 
On June 22, 2018, Peters filed the present action “to quiet title and 
for a determination that EOG had no right, title, or interest in the 
minerals subject to the [l]ease. Peters contended that the [l]ease 
automatically terminated when the bonus payment was not delivered 
to Peters before the end of the primary term of the Lease.”10 Peters and 
EOG both moved for summary judgment. 
On May 30, 2019, the trial court granted Peters’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied EOG’s countermotion for summary 
judgment. The trial court stated: 
 
Though the trial court found EOG attempted payment 
in good faith and had no notice of Peters’ change in 
address, the court found that the Lease required actual 
delivery [of the payment] to Peters, and that EOG 
failed to show it took any other steps before the Lease 
terminated to ascertain Peters’ address, which the court 
determined would have been discoverable with 
reasonable diligence . . . [T]he court determined that 
the Lease automatically terminated, and that the 
equitable rule against forfeiture did not apply because 
EOG did not show that circumstances outside of its 
control prevented timely delivery of the bonus 
payment.11 
 
EOG appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals issued a nineteen-
page opinion addressing the complex issues presented on appeal. In 
addressing the extent of guidance provided under the oil and gas lease, 
the Court stated in part as follows: 
 
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. Id. at 5. 
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Here, the Lease contained no terms specifying where 
or how payment must be made but only specified that 
it be delivered . . . while the lease required that changes 
in ownership be provided in writing before the lessee 
must take the change into account, the Lease contained 
no language requiring Peters to provide written notice 
of a change in address to the lessee, nor any term 
limiting EOG to delivery only to the address identified 
in the preamble of the Lease.12 
 
The Court observed later in its opinion: 
 
[W]e find nothing in the Lease language [that] provides 
that EOG’s attempt to deliver payment was sufficient 
as a matter of law to extend the Lease term. The trial 
court did not err in determining that EOG’s attempted 
payment did not in itself extend the Lease . . . .13 
 
Because the Lease was not extended by EOG’s 
attempted delivery of payment, the issue before the 
trial court was whether the equitable rule against 
forfeiture should apply . . . .14 
 
Here, the trial court determined that the Lease 
terminated and the equitable rule against forfeiture did 
not apply because it concluded that EOG ‘failed to take 
any steps to accomplish the timely payment upon 
learning the address was incorrect’ and that ‘Plaintiff’s 
correct address would have been discoverable with 
reasonable diligence.’ First, we find no facts of record 
establishing whether EOG could have learned of 
Peters’ change in address with reasonable diligence, 
and the trial court identified none in its findings . . . . 
Nothing of record addresses how EOG would have 
obtained Peters’ new address, or whether it could have 
 
 12. Id. at 11. 
 13. Id. at 12–13. 
 14. Id. at 13. 
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been accomplished before the Lease terminated. This 
finding is unsupported by the record.15 
 
The Court concluded in part: 
 
In sum, the material facts of record, even if undisputed, 
do not compel a single inference, on which to base 
summary judgment, that EOG failed to exercise 
reasonable diligence in attempting to make payment, 
and was itself responsible for failure to delivery [of the 
bonus payment] within the Lease term. Therefore, a 
dispute of fact remains on whether the equitable rule of 
forfeiture applied to protect EOG from termination of 
the Lease.  
 
While it is undisputed that EOG took initial steps to 
make payment before the Lease term expired, a 
question remains as to whether its steps to make timely 
payment were reasonable upon discovery that Peters’ 
address may not be correct, and whether EOG’s 
inability to make timely payment was the fault of a 
third party or EOG. We remand this action for the 
further proceedings to address these issues . . . .16  
 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial 
court’s May 30, 2019, order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Peters. 
III. OIL AND GAS LEASE CANCELLATION, TERMINATION AND BREACH 
OF OBLIGATION CASES (OTHER THAN ROYALTY)  
A. Oklahoma Court of Appeals found that it was undisputed that the 
subject well ceased production for more than 120 days and that 
required activity to save the leases did not resume. 
The lawsuit in Bollenbach v. Spess Oil Company, Inc.17 reached the 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals after Spess Oil Company, Inc. 
(“Spess”) appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for new trial 
 
 15. Id. at 14–15. 
 16. Id. at 17–18. 
 17. Disposition of Cases Other Than by Published Opinion, Court Issue 
#118,362, 91 OKLA. B. J. 1117, 1167 (Oct. 2, 2020). 
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in an action to quiet title and to cancel Spess’s interest in certain oil 
and gas leases. This summary of the appellate court’s twenty-page 
opinion will only note certain aspects of the court’s discussion. 
The plaintiff-mineral owners in this action sought to quiet title to, 
or cancel, certain oil and gas leases that allegedly held the Crosswhite 
27A well. The plaintiffs asserted that the well had ceased production 
in paying quantities, resulting in the termination of certain oil and gas 
lease in accordance with their terms.  
In the course of detailed proceedings, the trial court granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and certified that 
ruling for immediate appeal under 12 Oklahoma Statutes 2011 section 
994(A). Spess subsequently filed a timely application for new trial 
alleging various errors in the prior proceedings. The application for 
new trial was denied on September 27, 2019, and Spess appealed. The 
key rulings from the court of appeals’ lengthy decision are described 
below. 
First, the court found that the habendum clauses contained in the 
subject oil and gas leases provided that the leases would continue in 
effect beyond their primary terms as long as oil, gas, or both were 
produced—under Oklahoma law this means production in paying 
quantities.18 As recent affirmation of this longstanding principle of 
Oklahoma oil and gas law, the court noted the decision in Hall v. 
Galmor that “[i]n the context of cases where the well was not actually 
producing,” the term “produced” means “capable of producing in 
paying quantities.” 19 
Second, the court of appeals included the following key ruling in its 
twenty-one page opinion:  
 
When production in paying quantities ceases under the 
terms of a habendum clause, common law allows a 
reasonable time for resumption of drilling operations 
after a temporary cessation, unless the agreement 
contains a cessation of production clause, as in this 
case . . . . [The Subject Leases provide] that, if after the 
expiration of the primary term, the well “shall be 
incapable of producing,” the lease would terminate 
unless Spess resumed operations for drilling a well 
within 120 days from such cessation.20 
 
 18. See Steward v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 858 (Okla. 1979). 
 19. Hall v. Galmor, 427 P.3d 1052, 1063–64 (Okla. 2018). 
 20. Appeal from Dist. Ct. Kingfisher Cty, Okla., at 13–14, Bollenbach v. Spess 
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Third, Spess argued that it was irrelevant whether the Crosswhite 
27A well was producing in paying quantities was irrelevant and that 
Spess only needed to show that the well was capable of producing in 
paying quantities in order to extend the subject leases. In contrast, the 
plaintiffs asserted that the capability of production from the well 
would satisfy the habendum clause and prolong the oil and gas leases 
only if the well was shut-in. The plaintiffs alleged that if the well was 
actively producing, it must produce in paying quantities in order to 
satisfy the habendum clauses of the oil and gas leases. In sum, the 
plaintiffs contended that the Crosswhite 27A well must have been 
producing in paying quantities in order to keep the leases in force and 
effect beyond their primary terms.  
Fourth, after additional detailed analysis and discussion, the court 
of appeals stated that “[i]n short, Spess did not successfully dispute 
Plaintiffs’ undisputed material facts that the well ceased production in 
paying quantities for a protracted period in 2015 and 2016. The 
requirement of continued production in the Habendum Clause was not 
satisfied, and the Cessation Clause was therefore triggered.”21 
Lastly, the court of appeals found that “the well ceased production 
for more than 120 days and that production did not resume . . . [T]he 
well was active but not produc[ing] in paying quantities for more than 
120 days.”22 The court observed that Spess “supplied no acceptable 
evidentiary support to the contrary and presented nothing to support 
an equitable argument that the [s]ubject [l]eases should be deemed 
capable of production or should not terminate.” 23 The court of appeals 
concluded that “[t]he district court did not err in denying [p]laintiffs’ 
application for new trial after granting summary judgment to 
[p]laintiffs.”24 
B. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of 
the Defendants, finding that the Plaintiffs’ term mineral interest 
had expired.  
In Roggow, First Successor Trustee v. Teders,25 the appellants 
(plaintiffs below) appealed from the trial court’s summary judgment 
 
Oil Co., No. 118,362, (Okla. Civ. App. Sep. 18, 2020). 
 21. Id. at 17.  
 22. Id. at 17–18. 
 23. Id. at 18. 
 24. Id. at 18, 20.  
 25. Roggow v. Teders, No. 117,569, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Civ. App. Apr. 30, 
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order quieting title to certain mineral interests and an oil and gas lease 
in the appellees (defendants below). The issue on appeal was whether 
the trial court erred in holding that the temporary cessation of 
production doctrine resulted in the termination of the plaintiffs’ 
mineral interests in certain Kingfisher County lands. The mineral 
interest at issue was reserved by deed for a period of twenty years and 
as long thereafter as minerals are produced. The appellate court stated: 
 
In the present case, the Warranty Deed required 
production of oil, gas or other minerals to continue 
Plaintiffs’ ownership interest in the mineral estate past 
the primary term. It is undisputed the only producing 
well on the property ceased to continuously produce, 
for multiple periods, during the secondary term. 
Pursuant to the dictates of Ludwig, Plaintiffs’ term 
mineral interest therefore expired and such interest 
reverted to the Defendants. Because Defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the judgment 
of the trial court is affirmed.26 
C. Oklahoma Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, affirmed 
trial court’s denial of oil and gas lessors’ claims for reformation 
unjust enrichment, and unconscionability  
The case of Corbett v. Anadarko E&P Company, LP27 presented the 
oil and gas lessor-Corbetts’ appeal of the district court’s rulings in 
favor of defendant-Anadarko in the Corbetts’ suit for: (1) reformation 
of an oil and gas lease covering Pennsylvania28 lands, (2) denial of a 
claim for unjust enrichment, and (3) denial of a claim that the oil and 
gas lease at issue was unconscionable. 
The court’s opinion described the key factual assertions that led to 
this litigation. In 2006, the mineral owner-Corbetts began discussions 
with a leasing agent for Anadarko, concerning the proposed granting 
of an oil and gas lease covering the Corbetts’ property. The 
discussions for the proposed lease involved two tracts of land. The 
 
2020). 
 26. Id. at 10.  
 27. Corbett v. Andarko E&P Co., L.P., No. 117,721 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 17, 
2020). 
 28. Id. at 3 n.2 (observing that the tracts are located in Pennsylvania and the 
circumstances surrounding execution of the lease occurred in Pennsylvania.  The 
parties agree that Pennsylvania law controls the parties’ legal relationship). 
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“Overton Tract” was jointly owned by the plaintiffs, Kim and Kevin 
Corbett (the “Corbetts”). The “Herrick Tract” was owned only by 
Kevin Corbett. The two tracts were located approximately twenty 
miles apart. 
The court of appeals’ opinion describes certain details of the 
negotiations, drafting, and revisions to the proposed oil and gas lease, 
including that the one oil and gas lease was ultimately drafted to cover 
both distinct tracts of land referred to above.29 Testimony presented at 
the trial (with summary judgment entered earlier in favor of the other 
three defendants) established that it was common practice in 
Pennsylvania, and not unlawful, to lease non-contiguous tracts in a 
single oil and gas lease. The Corbetts also alleged that they questioned 
the approach of having the two distinct tracts covered by a single oil 
and gas lease and were assured Anadarko would split the tracts and 
account for each tract separately. However, Anadarko’s leasing agent 
denied those allegations and stated that she did not have authority to 
make any such representations. On June 6, 2006, the Corbetts 
executed the oil and gas lease with Anadarko. The court of appeals 
then described additional aspects of the factual history of the 
underlying dispute in detail.  
At the nonjury trial—which occurred over the objection of the 
Corbetts—the trial court denied the Corbetts’ claims for reformation 
and unjust enrichment and found that the oil and gas lease was 
enforceable and not unconscionable. The Corbetts appealed. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals first addressed the Corbetts’ claim 
for reformation of the oil and gas lease and damages based on the 
alleged false or mistaken representations of the leasing agent. 
However, Anadarko denied making any such representations, and the 
oil and gas lease provided that any representations would not be 
binding. The trial court found that there was no basis for the Corbetts 
to seek reformation on the ground of false or mistaken representations. 
The trial court stated, “The Corbetts accepted rentals and royalties for 
both tracts. They signed the ratification and division order covering 
both tracts. Last, they demanded development of the Overton Tract 
 
 29. Id. at 3 (indicating that the leasing agent presented the Corbetts with an initial 
oil and gas lease form that covered only the Overton Tract.  The Corbetts advised 
that they wanted to also lease the Herrick Tract.  The leasing agent, after checking 
title, submitted to the Corbetts a new lease form describing both tracts in the one 
lease).  
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after expiration of the primary term when the Overton lease would 
have terminated unless covered by a single lease.”30 
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in 
denying the Corbetts’ reformation of the oil and gas lease. The 
appellate court further found that the denial of reformation effectively 
confirmed the validity of the lease. Regarding the Corbetts’ claim of 
alleged unjust enrichment, the court of appeals found that a claim for 
unjust enrichment may only arise when a transaction of the parties not 
otherwise governed by an express agreement confers a benefit on the 
defendant to the plaintiff’s detriment, without any corresponding 
exchange of value. “[I]f there is a written contract, it must be 
unenforceable before unjust enrichment is available, otherwise the 
measure of damages is the damages from breach of contract. The trial 
court correctly ruled that given a valid written contract, there is no 
claim for unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania law.” Finally, the 
court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in declining 
to find the oil and gas lease unconscionable: “That finding would 
depend upon Pennsylvania law and none was cited to so hold . . . . An 
Oklahoma Court does not decide new law for another state.” 
The court of appeals found that the “Corbetts’ original petition 
claims [were] barred by applicable Statutes of Limitations. The facts 
of the case clearly show that Corbetts knew of their claim or had 
sufficient notice that they had a claim against Anadarko more than five 
years prior to filing their lawsuit yet continued to accept payments 
from Anadarko.”31 The court of appeals held that the trial court did not 
err in its foregoing rulings below. It affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court. 
D. Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Reversed Lower Court Order 
Dismissing Claims for Fraud and Related Causes of Action 
In Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Wyckoff,32 the Oklahoma 
Court of Civil Appeals reviewed Devon’s appeal of the trial court’s 
judgment granting Wyckoff’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted under 12 Oklahoma Statutes 
section 2012(B)(6). 
Devon alleged that the defendants’ attorney “approached Devon 
about entering into leases with his two clients regarding lease holdings 
 
 30. Id. at 15.. 
 31. Id. at 16–17. 
 32. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. Wyckoff, 457 P. 3d 284, 284 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2019). 
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that had recently been released”33 by another company. Devon and the 
defendants executed two new oil and gas leases covering land in 
Woodward County, Oklahoma. Devon paid almost $1.6 million for 
the two leases. The court found that Devon assumed responsibility for 
a title search34 and noted that the new lease did not provide any 
warranty of title by the defendants. Devon subsequently learned that 
Chesapeake’s only interest in the property at issue was a wellbore in 
the Wyckoff 2-3 well located on the leased premises. A 1956 lease 
covering multiple sections, including the mineral acres Devon 
understood it was acquiring under the new lease, was still held by 
production from one or more wells. As a result, Wyckoff had no 
mineral acres available for lease at the time they entered into the new 
leases with Devon. Yet, the defendants argued that because they did 
not warrant title to Devon, the defendants should be permitted to keep 
the lease payments Devon made. 
In the present lawsuit, Devon asserted claims for breach of implied 
covenant of quiet enjoyment, actual fraud, constructive fraud, 
rescission, and unjust enrichment. The court reviewed Devon’s appeal 
under a de novo standard. After reviewing prior, relevant decisions, 
the appellate court concluded that the district court’s decision should 
be reversed in light of Devon’s allegation of fraud. The court cited 
findings in a prior case that “the doctrine of caveat emptor would ‘not 
shield a seller from purporting to sell that which he does not have.’”35 
Here, Devon alleged the defendants knew or should have known that 
the net mineral acres were not available for lease to Devon because 
they were covered by the 1956 lease that continued in force and effect 
by production.  
On the record before it, the court could not determine whether any 
fraud was perpetrated; “In light of the uniquely fact-specific fraud 
claim presented here, [d]efendants did not meet”36 their burden to 
show the legal insufficiency of the petition. The court of civil appeals 
reversed the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss Devon’s petition for allegedly failing to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. The cause was remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
 
 33. Id. at 285. 
 34. Id. at 285 n.2 (noting that “Devon’s title search did not reveal an existing 
1956 lease at the time the parties entered into the lease agreement.”). 
 35. French Energy, Inc. v. Alexander, 818 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Okla. 1991). 
 36. Wyckoff, 457 P. 3d at 287. 
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IV. OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS, TRANSACTIONS AND TITLE MATTERS 
In late December 2019, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Texas (Houston Division) in Alta Mesa Holdings, LP v. 
Kingfisher Midstream37 held that certain oil and gas gathering 
agreements between Alta Mesa (as producer) and Kingfisher (as 
gatherer) “ran with the land” under the applicable Oklahoma law and 
were not subject to rejection under section 365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.38 The court entered summary judgment in favor of Kingfisher 
on the issue of rejection.39  
V. SURFACE USE, SURFACE DAMAGES, OKLAHOMA SURFACE 
DAMAGES ACT, CONDEMNATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 
A. Operator in an Oklahoma Surface Damages Act Proceeding 
Demanded a Jury Trial, and the Jury Returned a Verdict More 
Favorable to the Operator, the Operator’s claim for Attorney’s 
Fees was Denied. 
In State of Oklahoma ex rel. Commissioners of the Land Office v. 
Stephens and Johnson Operating Co., Inc.,40 the operator appealed the 
lower court’s denial of its application for attorney’s fees under 
Oklahoma’s Surface Damages Act.41 
When the operator and surface owner were unable to reach an 
agreement regarding the amount of surface damages incurred by the 
surface owner in connection with drilling operations on four oil and 
gas wells, the surface owner initiated proceedings under the Surface 
Damages Act. The trial court appointed three appraisers to assess the 
damages. Two of the three appraisers used a majority report, setting 
damages at $450,000.00. The minority appraiser assessed damages in 
the much lower amount of $120,515.00. Dissatisfied with the majority 
report, the operator demanded a jury trial. 
The jury awarded damages in favor of the surface owner in the 
amount of $206,192.97. Neither the operator nor the surface owner 
 
 37. In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90, 95 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Tex. 2019). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.; see In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 2019) 
(another decision reaching a similar conclusion under Utah law). But see In re Sabine 
Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying Texas law for a 
case reaching an opposing outcome). 
 40. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office v. Stephens & Johnson Operating 
Co., 474 P.3d 869, 871 (Okla. 2020). 
 41. Id. at 870. 
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appealed. The operator then filed an application to recover attorney’s 
fees and costs in the amount of $359,458.71. The trial court denied the 
operator’s request, and the Operator appealed. The Oklahoma Court 
of Appeals affirmed the denial of fees and costs. Both the trial court 
and the court of appeals found that Oklahoma’s Surface Damages Act 
did not provide for an award of fees and costs under the facts of this 
case. The court of appeals found that the Surface Damages Act 
provides for costs and attorney’s fees to be assessed only when the 
party demanding a jury trial fails to obtain a verdict more favorable 
than the appraisers’ assessment.  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
Court of Appeals’ decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found in 
part: 
 
Here, the express requirements for Operator’s 
requested award of attorney fees and costs under § 
318.5(F) have not been satisfied. Under the plain terms 
of the Act, only the non-jury demanding party may 
recover its fees and costs and only when the jury-
demanding party failed to obtain a more favorable 
verdict than the appraiser’s award. The terms of § 
318.5(F) are equally applicable in their treatment of the 
demanding party, regardless of whether a surface 
owner or an operator demands the jury trial. This is not 
a prevailing party provision. Because Operator was the 
jury-demanding party and received a more favorable 
verdict, it is not entitled to fees herein under the plain 
terms of the SDA.42 
 
The Court proceeded to review in detail a chronology of prior 
decisions regarding the award of attorney’s fees in cases under the 
Oklahoma Surface Damages Act. That discussion should be reviewed 
by any parties who are researching this topic. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court summarized its conclusion as follows: 
 
Operator demanded the jury trial herein and the jury 
returned a verdict for less than the amount of the 
appraisers’ award, a more favorable result to Operator. 
The cases awarding fees and costs to surface owners 
 
 42. Id. at 872. 
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under § 318.5(F) of the SDA have no application in this 
case because that provision is limited to situations 
where the jury demanding party fails to obtain a verdict 
more favorable than the appraisers’ award. Likewise, 
cases awarding attorney fees under § 55(D) to 
landowners that obtained a verdict in excess of the 
appraisers’ award by 10% are also inapplicable in this 
case because that statute allows an award of fees solely 
to land owners. Consequently, Operator, the party 
demanding the jury trial in this case, is not entitled to 
an award of attorney fees under Oklahoma statutory or 
case law. The trial court properly denied Operator’s 
request for fees and costs.43 
 
The court of appeals’ opinion was withdrawn, and the judgment of the 
trial court was affirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court 
found that cases awarding fees and costs to surface owners under 
section 318.5(F) of the Surface Damages Act have no application in 
this case because that provision is limited to situations where the jury-
demanding party fails to obtain a verdict more favorable than the 
appraisers’ award.44 
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court Affirmed District Court’s Denial of 
Exceptions to Report of Commissioners in Pipeline 
Condemnation Action  
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America LLC v. Foster OK 
Resources LP,45 NGPL condemned easements for access to operate 
and maintain two interstate natural gas pipelines and to clear title 
issues involving the pipelines. Foster disputed NGPL’s attempted 
exercise of eminent domain and asserted that NGPL’s taking did not 
meet the legal standard of necessity. However, Foster did not dispute 
that NGPL possessed the right of eminent domain where the 
prerequisites for eminent domain were present.  
The district court appointed three commissioners to determine the 
just compensation owed to Foster due to NGPL’s taking of the several 
easements. After the commissioners filed their report, Foster filed 
exceptions to the report. After conducting a hearing, the district court 
 
 43. Id. at 874. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. LLC v. Foster OK Res. LP, 465 P. 3d 1206, 
1206 (Okla. 2020). 
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overruled Foster’s exceptions; Foster appealed. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court retained the appeal—there was no earlier ruling by an 
intermediate appellate court. 
In its appeal, Foster first argued that the existing easement 
agreements between Foster and NGPL precluded NGPL from seeking 
the additional easements through condemnation. Foster argued that 
NGPL sought to use eminent domain to bypass the existing easement 
agreements and obtain permanent easements that conflicted with and 
abrogated the protections negotiated by the parties in the easement 
agreements. The Court disagreed and held that the right of 
condemnation is inalienable and cannot be waived, contracted away, 
or surrendered in whole or in part.46 The Court determined that the 
temporary and permanent easements sought by NGPL through this 
condemnation proceeding were outside the scope of the existing 
easement agreements. The Court added that even if the existing 
easement agreements contemplated similar rights, those agreements 
did not divest NGPL of its right to eminent domain. 
Foster next argued that NGPL’s taking did not meet the legal 
standard of necessity for a public use. The Court found that the word 
“necessity” in connection with condemnation proceedings does not 
mean an absolute necessity but only a reasonable necessity, such as 
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least 
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property 
owner.47 The Court concluded that the taking of the easements through 
condemnation was necessary and was not fraudulent, in bad faith, or 
an abuse of discretion. 
However, Foster asserted that the taking sought through this lawsuit 
was not necessary and amounted to fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of 
discretion because another optional means of access to the pipelines 
was available to NGPL. Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that 
it “is well settled in Oklahoma that where a condemner has selected 
and designated a route for taking, the courts will not inquire into the 
matter to demand why some other route was not chosen.”48 The Court 
cited the prior decision in Graham v. Tulsa,49 which discussed the 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Grangeville Highway District 
 
 46. Id. at 1210 (citing in support of this holding its prior decision in Burke v. 
Okla. City, 250 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1960)). 
 47. Id. at 1211 (citing White v. Pawhuska, 265 P. 1059, 1062 (Okla. 1928)). 
 48. Id. (citing Owens v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 283 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla. 1954), and 
City of Tulsa v. Williams, P. 876, 879 (Okla. 1924)). 
 49. Id. 
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v. Ailshie.50 The Court in Ailshie held that defendants in condemnation 
actions cannot prevail merely by showing there is other land in the 
immediate neighborhood available and equally useful.51 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court observed that other states similarly held 
that simply because some other available route may be sufficient or 
may even be more desirable was not adequate to show fraud, bad faith, 
or an abuse of discretion. In particular, the Court held that NGPL’s 
taking and resort to condemnation did not amount to fraud, bad faith, 
or an abuse of discretion merely because other means of access to the 
pipelines were available to NGPL.52  
In determining the necessity of NGPL’s taking, the Court found that 
NGPL’s request for a permanent, nonexclusive easement over Foster’s 
road was reasonably necessary and that Foster produced no evidence 
indicating that NGPL’s taking was fraudulent, in bad faith, or an abuse 
of discretion.  
In sum, the court held that: (1) NGPL did not contract away its right 
of eminent domain by entering into earlier easement agreements with 
Foster; (2) that NGPL had another means of access to its pipelines was 
insufficient to show that NGPL’s taking was fraudulent, in bad faith, 
or an abuse of discretion; (3) NGPL’s condemnation of Foster’s 
property was for a public use and met the legal standard of necessity; 
and (4) arguments relating to the necessity of surveying Foster’s 
property in computing the just compensation due to Foster were 
premature and could not be determined before the anticipated jury trial 
on that issue. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling. 
VI. OTHER ENERGY INDUSTRY CASES 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s ruling 
invalidating a city ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance 
conflicted with a state statute. The case of Magnum Energy, Inc. v. 
Board of Adjustment for the City of Norman53 presented the review of 
a “quasi-judicial administrative decision” from the City of Norman’s 
Board of Adjustment (the “Board”). Magnum Energy sought a 
variance from a city ordinance requiring umbrella liability insurance 
as a condition to issuing a drilling permit within the Norman city 
limits. The Board denied the request. Magnum appealed that decision 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 720. 
 52. Grangeville Highway Dist. V. Ailshie, 290 P. 717, 720 (Idaho 1930).  
 53. Magnum Energy, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for the City of Norman, No. 
117,912, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Civ. App. June 4, 2020). 
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to the Cleveland County District Court. The district court found that 
the city ordinance conflicted with a state statute regulating oil and gas 
production and was, therefore, invalid as applied to Magnum. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Magnum; the 
Board appealed. The court of appeals found that a de novo standard of 
review applied in this appeal. 
The court of appeals observed at the outset of its decision that “[t]he 
dispositive question on appeal is whether there is a conflict between 
the [City of Norman’s] ordinance and the state statute.” Citing the 
prior decision in Vinson v. Medley,54 the court of appeals found that 
“[f]or matters of general statewide concern, a municipal ordinance will 
be invalid if it conflicts with a state enactment.”55 The court of appeals 
further stated that “[a] city charter supersedes state law only when it 
affects a subject that is deemed to lie exclusively within municipal 
concern.”56 The court further found “[a] conflict between a state 
statute and municipal ordinance exists when ‘both contain either 
express or implied conditions that are inconsistent and irreconcilable 
with one another. If one is silent on the issue and the other speaks to 
it, there can be no conflict.’”57 
In the present appeal, the court stated that the ordinance at issue “is 
an insurance requirement that must be met for the [c]ity to issue a 
permit; it is a business practice safeguarding the health, safety, and 
welfare of the [c]ity and its citizens.”58 In contrast, the Oklahoma 
statute at issue59 “regulates oilfield operations and allow[s] for 
municipal control over indirectly regulated oil and gas operation 
concerns of a wellsite, such as public nuisances, property setbacks, 
and flood prevention.”60 The court additionally recognized that 17 
Oklahoma Statutes section 52 specifies the scope of the Corporation 
Commission’s authority. That statute provides that “[t]he Corporation 
Commission and incorporated cities and towns shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over permit fees for the drilling and operation of oil and 
gas wells.”61  
The court of appeals held that the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas of oil and gas 
 
 54. Id. at 3.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 5 ((citing Gant v. Okla. City, 6 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Okla. 1931)). 
 59. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2020). 
 60. Magnum Energy, Inc., No. 117,912 at 5. 
 61. Id. at 6. 
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regulation did not preclude the city’s ordinance. The court found that 
the ordinance was enforceable and that the District Court’s contrary 
conclusion was an error and therefore reversed in this appeal. 
